Whither the WTO: Is the Doha Round Lost?
By Michael L. Jensen
Recently
at a conference on U.S.-China bilateral relations in Beijing, United States
Trade Representative Rob Portman acknowledged that the Doha Development Agenda
(“Doha Round” or “DDA”), of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) negotiations “face
very serious challenges.” Then he
made a pitch. In order to “avoid
losing the opportunity presented by Doha,” which is “a once in a generation
opportunity to reduce tariffs and reduce trade distorting subsidies around the
world,” Mr. Portman stated that ‘[w]e need the help of WTO member countries . .
. to make a push for significant progress in the weeks and months ahead.”[1] His pitch is as needed as his
assessment is obvious: on the eve of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in
Hong Kong in December, the Doha Round is in trouble, and only a concerted
effort by member countries, and significant concessions by the holdouts, can
rescue the stalled global trade talks.
Background
The
Doha Round began in 2001 as an ambitious effort to improve market access and
reform in agriculture, services, and manufactured goods. The reasoning behind this approach
seemed clear: freer trade produces a win-win situation for developed and
developing nations alike. As just
one supporting fact, the World Bank reported that, during the 1990’s, per
capita real income grew an average of five percent annually in developing
countries that fostered freer trade, nearly three times faster than the average
annual increase of 1.4 percent for countries that did not.[2] Further, “World Bank research found
that growth in developing countries benefits the poor: average incomes of the poorest fifth of
society rise proportionately with average incomes. Factors such as rule of law, openness to international
trade, and developed financial markets benefit the poorest fifth of society as
much as everyone else.”[3] Developing countries comprise
approximately two thirds of the WTO’s membership; a successful trade round
could therefore have a profoundly positive impact on the global economy. But, as the World Bank noted recently,
“the liberalization targets under the DDA have to be ambitious if the round is
to have a measurable impact on world markets, and hence poverty . . . .”[4]
The
Key Issue: Agriculture Reform
A
key issue of the Doha Round has been agricultural reform. Although this issue was touched on in
the previous round (the “Uruguay Round”) of negotiations, it was highlighted as
a focus of the Doha Round, primarily because so many developing countries have a
comparative advantage in agriculture and insisted that this issue be
included. According to Mr.
Portman’s assessment, “[t]wo of the three pillars of agriculture
reform—eliminating export subsidies and reducing domestic support—are pretty
well along,” and are “in good shape for negotiation.” But the “final pillar”—market access—is “not as far along.”[5] That is an understatement. After four years of negotiations, and
despite a significant U.S. proposal in October meant to reduce tariffs using
the “tiered formula” in the July 2004 Framework, precious little progress has
been made regarding agricultural market access and reform, let alone the other
important areas of the ambitious Doha Round agenda.
Most
of the blame for the political and bureaucratic foot dragging in the
agricultural sector has been leveled at the European Union (“EU”), and
especially France, for clinging to long standing and, some assert, addictive
farm subsidies. But the situation
is not so simple. As noted
recently in the Wall Street Journal, “[a]t the core of the stalled talks
is a spaghetti bowl of conflicting demands.”[6] A group of nations that are net
importers of agricultural goods, including Switzerland and Japan (the “Group of
10”), have offered only modest reductions in their farm sector tariffs, which
would leave them in some cases higher than the EU.[7] Perhaps predictably, some members
of the Group of 10 have demanded, hostage style, deep cuts in tariffs in the
manufacturing sector before entertaining further reductions in the farm sector.
Other
countries are following suit in their own way, pursing (naturally) their own
interests. Brazil, for example, as
a member of the so-called “Group of 20,” made up of richer developing
countries, demands that the EU substantially improve its offer to reduce farm
sector tariffs, but adamantly refuses to consider reductions in its own high
tariffs on the manufacturing sector.
As another example, India, a fellow Group of 20 member, stands firmly
behind its own high farm sector tariffs, but unsurprisingly argues that other
countries should make more progress in opening up the services sector.[8] And so it goes, country by country, and
the result is a largely fractured approach in the Doha Round. While the lack of consensus is perhaps
most obvious in the agricultural sector, there are still huge gaps in how to
approach the services and manufacturing sectors as well.
Recent
Developments
Early
in November, trade representatives from five powerhouses (the United States,
the EU, Japan, Brazil and India) met in London and tried—unsuccessfully—to
breathe new life into the negotiations.
Immediately thereafter, representatives of a larger subgroup of
countries met in Geneva with the same objective, and the same unfortunate
result. As Pascal Ramy,
Director-General of the WTO, pointedly observed to the delegates in
Geneva:
Some have said
they are not in a position, at this stage, to move further on Agricultural
market access, unless there is more on the table on NAMA [Non-Agricultural
Market Access], Services or GIs.
Others have said they are only able to keep their offer on reduction of
Domestic Subsidies if there is an improved offer on market access in
agriculture on the table. Yet
others say they can only agree to . . . a proposal of cuts of its industrial
tariffs (NAMA) . . . if there is an improvement in, and to the extent of, a new
offer on Agricultural market access.
And we also hear from other sides that they will only discuss NAMA if
there is a sufficient degree of precision on Special Products and the Special
Safeguard Mechanism.
All of this adds
up to some very wide gulfs . . . .[9]
Mr. Lamy attempted to put the
best face on the state of the Doha Round by observing, rather lamely, that
“what is already [on the negotiating table] is not negligible,” and that
“nobody wants to reduce the level of ambition for the Round.”[10] But in a burst of candor, Mr. Lamy
observed that “the question is whether—to use the words of the Indian Minister
Kamal Nath—we ‘recalibrate’ the expectations for Hong Kong—to what can
reasonably be achieved or whether we are ready to run the risk of making Hong
Kong an ‘announced failure’.”[11] The answer seemed clear in the malaise
among the delegates, and their unwillingness to offer further compromises of
significance: prepare for the Hong Kong meeting with “recalibrated ambitions.”[12]
In
the wake of these disappointing developments, leaders of 21 Pacific Rim
countries met at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) forum in Busan,
Korea on November 18-19, 2005.
High on the list of agenda items was the Doha Round. The government leaders issued a
statement supporting the ambitious (read: not “recalibrated”) objectives of the Round heading into the Hong Kong
meeting. While an unnamed South
Korean government official lamented that the statement would likely fall on
deaf ears, another observer of the forum observed more hopefully that “APEC
includes seven of the world’s 13 largest economies, represents more than a
third of the world’ population, and constitutes 60 percent of the global
economy and nearly half world trade, putting it in a position where it cannot
be ignored.”[13] President George W. Bush and Chinese
President Hu Jintao, in a joint press conference in Beijing on November 20,
also stressed the importance of “building consensus on market access issues” at
the Hong Kong meeting, in order to permit a new global trade agreement in 2006.[14]
Whether
such last minute endorsements will affect the substance of the Hong Kong
meeting is doubtful. The real
question is whether, among the widely disparate interests of the 148 members of
the WTO, enough members can muster the courage to seize, in Mr. Portman’s words
noted above, this “once in a generation opportunity to reduce tariffs and
reduce trade distorting subsidies around the world.”
*Editor's Note: The Wall Street Journal reported on Dec. 18 that WTO
negotiators reached a breakthrough on the most contentious issue in the
trade talks in Hong Kong, agreeing that wealthy countries would
eliminate farm-export subsidies by 2013.
For
more information regarding the Doha Round, please contact Michael Jensen at mjensen@kmclaw.com.
[1] Remarks by Robert Portman at a conference hosted by China-U.S. Relations: Trade, Diplomacy and Research, November 14, 2005 (“Portman Remarks”).
[2] “Facts on the Doha Round,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Doha Development Agenda Policy Brief, October 2005.
[3] Id.
[4] World Bank, “Putting Development Back into the Development Agenda.”
[5] Portman Remarks
[6] Miller, Scott, “Clock Is Ticking on Trade Talks: Doha Round of Negotiations Gets Bogged Down in Farm Tariffs,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 8, 2005, p. A14.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Remarks of Director-General Pascal Lamy, World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, Nov. 10, 2005.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] “APEC has a tough job ahead in freeing up world trade,” ShanghaiDaily.com, Nov. 22, 2005.
[14] Hu, Peggy B., “Bush, Chinese President Discuss Trade Issues at Beijing Meeting,” USINFO.STATE.GOV, Nov. 20, 2005.